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hemorrhage through a revival of NKP’s winning strategy of reformist conservatism.
Against their challenge, Lee Hoi-chang responded with a strategy of political buyout.
However, because South Korea’s 1987 constitution neither established an office of vice
presidency nor legally guaranteed a fixed tenure for prime minister, thus making it
difficult to build a coalition through power sharing, Lee Hoi-chang could buy out only one
rival, not both. His choice was Cho Soon.
Even if Lee Hoi-chang wanted, it was unlikely that Rhee In-jae would have
accepted an offer of partnership. On the contrary, Rhee In-jae thought it was Lee Hoi-
chang who should withdraw from the race, given the public ratings. He topped Lee Hoi-
chang in every poll between August 21 and November 9. For Rhee In-jae, moreover, even
a defeat would be a success if he carried one fifth of South Korea’s electorate, as public
polls forecasted.
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With that level of support, he thought he would become a major
contender for presidential power in 2002. The former governor of Kyong’gi Province
would also become a king maker in 1997, clearing a way to Kim Dae-jung’s victory and,
thus, assured of Kim Dae-jung’s support in his 2002 presidential bid.
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As much as Rhee
In-jae lacked an incentive to withdraw from the race, Lee Hoi-chang lacked instruments to
lure Rhee In-jae into a coalition. Within South Korea’s 1987 constitutional order, which
concentrated power in the presidency, Lee Hoi-chang could at best offer the post of prime
minister, like Kim Dae-jung did in forging an alliance with Kim Jong-pil. Or, he could
promise to forego the leadership of Hannara Party along with its prerogative to choose
candidates for South Korea’s national assembly election of 2000, as he actually ended up
doing when he merged forces with Cho Soon.
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However, those offers were fit for minor
candidates,
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not a rising star like Rhee In-jae. The prime minister was a ceremonial
figure, appointed and dismissed at the whim of the president. Likewise, there existed no
Convention