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mainstream faction of the KMT under the leadership Lee Teng-Hui during the latter half
of the 1990s for all intents and purposes rejected the ‘One China’ principle as the basis
for cross strait negotiations, a significant refinement on the KMT’s historically hard-line
position regarding Taiwan’s relationship with China. Though subsequent KMT leaders
Lien Chan and now Ma Ying-Jeou have attempted to backpedal on Lee’s proclamations,
they too understand that the majority of the Taiwan electorate will not entertain notions
of short-term unification with China (Tan, 2002). Simply put, while the national identity
question remains a critical issue in democratic Taiwan’s politics, party convergence on
this particular political cleavage – and more importantly, the public’s perception of such
convergence – means that neither the KMT nor the DPP can own the issue outright
(Schubert, 2004: 534). As Cal Clark puts it, the national identity issue tends to be “a loser
at the polls” (Clark, 2001: 106).
This does not mean, however, that the available ‘space’ to accommodate or even
facilitate the emergence of new electoral cleavages and issues is at all constrained in
democratic Taiwan. In fact, the nature of democratic deepening in Taiwan has resulted in
quite the opposite. Democratic transition – the expansion of elections, the rejuvenation of
civil society, and the dynamics of political entrepreneurship – has encouraged the
construction of new politically salient cleavages, such as in the areas of social policy, the
environment, good governance, and so on. Furthermore, because Taiwan’s political party
system is inherently non-programmatic, political entrepreneurs have not been constrained
when it comes to the social, economic and political issues upon which they might look to
build new electoral coalitions. In short, the politics of issue ownership in Taiwan remain
relatively open-ended (Wong, 2003).
Convention