societal distrust are problems plaguing both post-authoritarian regimes and post-conflict regimes.
Distrust is not the same as a lack of trust. Transitional regimes don’t simply have to build trust in
the new institutions, as if this were a simple process to begin with. But first, they must break
down the distrust before trust can start to be reestablished. As such, vetting and lustration in
particular are crucial processes to break a cycle of distrust, and therefore allow the construction
of trustworthy institutions as well as generalized interpersonal trust.
In this piece I intend to make the assumptions and mechanisms linking vetting and trust
building explicit. An examination of the nature of trust will shed light on the strengths and
limitations of vetting in general. It will highlight the role that vetting plays in the construction of
trustworthy, effective democratic regimes, and debunk some of the mythology surrounding the
purported effects of vetting, both positive and negative. In addition, I hope to make two
additional contributions to our understanding of vetting and trust in transitional economies. First,
I will demonstrate that the process of vetting helps to break cycles of distrust. Before one can
start with trust building exercises one must overcome a presumption of distrust. This
presumption impedes the process of democratization. Second, I hope to demonstrate that vetting
affects institutional trust by altering people’s perceptions about the capabilities, interests, and
incentives of the institution. Vetting also has an indirect effect on interpersonal trust. By
highlighting the impact of distrust on assessments of public institutions, I hope to make a small
contribution to our understanding of the mechanisms linking vetting and good governance.
Vetting involves many moral and judicial tradeoffs. “Rule of law” versus “justice” are the
crude umbrella terms under which the many ethical and legal tradeoffs are grouped. Retroactivity
versus due process, individual guilt versus collective guilt, rule of law versus justice and
retribution, forgiving versus forgetting, forward looking versus backward looking institutional
orders, fairness versus efficacy, are just some of the many types of tradeoffs debated in the
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Convention