I argue that distrust is different from a lack of trust. Distrust not only means that an
individual does not have the incentives, interests, or competence to engage in “trustworthy”
interactions, it suggests negative intentions and an active undermining of one’s interests. It
connotes that the “other,” in this case individual or institution, has negative intentions.
In the
context of the trust definition, this means that agent A (dis)trusts agent B to do X, based on a
probabilistic assessment of agent B’s interests, incentives, and capabilities. Sztompka defines
distrust as the “negative mirror image of trust,” involving negative expectations about the actions
of others. He differentiates this from “mistrust” which refers to a neutral situation between trust
My understanding of distrust draws on this distinction. As such, distrust does not
simply impede social interactions, it can forestall the possibility of even starting social exchange.
If one believes that the other intends harm, there is no reason to engage in exchange at all.
Hardin suggests “far more than could be true of trust, I might distrust a large number of
people with respect to virtually everything.”
This generalized understanding of distrust fits with
the social capital literature’s understanding of the role of interpersonal trust and social networks
However, in this sense we come to understand distrust as having a negative
impact on the ability of citizens to engage in cooperative activities. A lack of social capital or an
active distrust of others impedes exchange relations and social interactions. Since distrust is not
simply the absence of trust, but is the inverse, distrust must be broken before trust can be built.
15
Edna Ullmann-Margalit, “Trust, Distrust, and In Between,” in Russell Hardin (ed.) Distrust. (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 2004): 60-82.
16
Sztompka p. 26.
17
Hardin 2004, p. 3.
18
James Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." American Journal of Sociology 94,
Supplement (1988): 95-120; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. (New
York: Free Press, 1995); and Robert Putnam, 1993.
19
Margaret Levi has argued that a healthy distrust can exist between parties that is actually beneficial. Distrust
can force the creation of institutions, to measure, monitor and enforce exchange activities. As a result distrust might
not be intrinsically bad or suboptimal. Other studies on distrust have also looked at distrust from a quasi-positive
perspective. In this paper, I will make an assumption about distrust undermining cooperative behavior that is integral
to the civil society. Therefore in the context of building trustworthy political institutions, I will argue that distrust is
an impediment. See Margaret Levi. “When Good Defenses Make Good Neighbors,” in Menard (ed.) Institutions,
Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional Economics. (Colchester, UK: Edward Elgar
Press, 2000).
9
Convention