"In the course of [the 1956 and 1957] elections, a structure of three-sided competition
was established, developed, and entrenched. It provided the basic and permanent
dimensions of national politics throughout the complex of changes in regime and party
organization occurring down to the late 1960s" (Staniland 1973a: 311).
Relatively small changes in the incentive structures by which local interests are
translated into national politics appear to have affected these permanent dimensions of
national politics in fundamental ways. Although the design of electoral institutions in
Benin was presumably not intended to produce 100 political parties, it may nevertheless
have achieved the restructuring of politics it sought, through unanticipated channels. The
result appears to be that "complex group morphology and spatial distribution of ethnic
groups ... combine with the institutional designs of the electoral system to exert strong
pressure for political parties to form electoral coalitions that cut across the characteristic
inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic cleavages" (Creevey 2005:474). Looking at this from the
other side, the ease of coalition formation allows more localized parties to be successful,
thus increasing their appeal vis-a-vis larger regional parties. In this context, although
ethnic voting and clientism are both strong, communal swing voting occurs readily at the
point of coalition formation. As a result, the election is not a "census," despite the fact
that the rules facilitate communal politics and the intricate personal networks that
continue to link state and society.
Benin has thus far found stability in a system of personalized elite politics resting
upon a fragmented urban and peasant electorate. The "intricate strategies adopted by
party leaders to maintain electoral support and acquire political power have been carried
out in a context where voters and politicians appear to know and accept the rules of the
game. This acceptance underpins the success of democracy" (Creevey 2005: 472). But
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