well have been quite similar to the post election pact. With nearly 50% of the population
in his regional stronghold and Banda especially unpopular in the north, Muluzi would
likely have won a second round poll standing alone against Banda with or without
Chihana's support. The parliamentary balance would have remained the same, and the
coalition making presumably largely similar as well. The third election in Malawi
demonstrated a tendency toward a larger number of smaller opposition parties, which
might create new opportunities for cross-regional alliances both in support of, and in
opposition to, the ruling party. If the southern elite recovers from the disarray in which in
now finds itself, small opposition parties and independent MPs will always the incentive
ally with whomever controls the presidency (and the real purse strings), as they have with
President Mutharika's new DPP party this year. Under these conditions, patrimonial
imperatives will continue to eat away at the substance, if not the processes, of the
democratic regime.
Malawi' is among the ten poorest countries in the world, and among the most
foreign aid dependent. At the time of its transition to democracy, per capita GDP was
$180 and foreign aid was 97% of government expenditures (World Bank 1997,
Lancanster 1999: 67). Rural smallholders constitute the vast majority of the population.
Under these conditions, Malawi was largely swept along by the undercurrent of
democratization in the 1990s. Rural voters expect little from government, and get what
they expect. Urban civil society remains largely absent. Political parties, always loosely
structured by patron-client networks appear to be growing less rather than more
institutionalized. Under these conditions, donor conditionality and a modicum of judicial
independence may keep elites playing the democratic game, leaving the door open for the
growth of institutional supports that might over time begin to provide some badly needed
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Convention