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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42029_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Moffett, Ken. "Parties and the Use of Managers' Amendments in the Postreform House" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42029_index.html>

Moffett, K. , 2005-09-01 "Parties and the Use of Managers' Amendments in the Postreform House" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42029_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Scholars have advanced competing explanations for the use of restrictive procedures in the House. Surprisingly, few scholars have examined when floor managers are more likely to amend bills, but none have provided a systematic explanation for when we are more likely to observe such activity. This is especially surprising, given that floor managers amended an average of 7.76 % of all bills on the floor from 1981 through 2004. Through a dataset of sampled bills from the 97th through 108th Congresses, I test these competing explanations. I learn that floor managers are more likely to amend multiply referred bills. However, floor managers are less likely to amend bills as the Republican and Democratic parties become more different and as the floor and majority party medians diverge, relative to the previous Congress.

Fighting From the Floor: Minority Parties' Use of House Floor Procedure

Procedural Control and Majority Party Entrenchement in the U.S. House: An Explanation of Rules Restrictiveness Over Time