Parties and the use of Managers’ Amendments in the Postreform House
Scholars have advanced competing explanations for the use of restrictive procedures in
the House. Surprisingly, few scholars have examined when floor managers are more likely to
amend bills, but none have provided a systematic explanation for when we are more likely to
observe such activity. This is especially surprising, given that floor managers amended an
average of 7.76 % of all bills on the floor from 1981 through 2004. Through a dataset of sampled
bills from the 97
th
through 108
th
Congresses, I test these competing explanations. I learn that
floor managers are more likely to amend multiply referred bills. However, floor managers are
less likely to amend bills as the Republican and Democratic parties become more different and as
the floor and majority party medians diverge, relative to the previous Congress.
1
Convention