unions). Unions alienated from political institutions, including electoral politics, are
more likely to sustain radical mobilization strategies (as in the case of Korean unions).
To put the argument into an analogy of scooters and cars, Korean unions are
required to drive cars (political party) which demand a huge down-payment on their part
because the roads (political institutions) are catering only to the needs of big motors
(being centralized and non-permeable). In contrast, unions in Taiwan are riding scooters
which are inexpensive and versatile because the streets are accommodative to lesser
vehicles (decentralized and inclusive). In short, labor politics largely resemble the
familiar street scenes in Seoul and Taipei, or Ulsan and Kaohsiung, each country’s
industrial towns, in which one is packed with cars and the other with scooters. Then, it
is not hard to imagine what happens when a traffic jam occurs. Guess who will get to
the final destination more effectively?
In the following sections, I first present data on union activism in Korea and
Taiwan and then critically examine the validity of existing explanations. I propose a
political institutional argument in understanding and analyzing the pattern of labor
politics, with a presentation of interview data collected from my field research in Korea
1
Field research to Korea and Taiwan took place from August 2002 to June 2003 and in summer 2004,
producing thirty seven interviews in Korea and thirty six in Taiwan. Interviewees included
workers/unionists, labor activists, employers, bureaucrats, politicians and labor scholars.
4
Convention