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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42207_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Shapiro, Jacob. and Siegel, David. "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42207_index.html>

Shapiro, J. N. and Siegel, D. A. , 2005-09-01 "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42207_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: A review of international terrorist activity reveals a recurring pattern of financially strapped operatives working for terrorist organizations that seem to have plenty of money. To explain this observation, we present a hierarchical model of terror organizations in which leaders must delegate financial and logistical tasks to middlemen for security reasons. These middlemen do not always share their leaders’ interests. In particular, the temptation exists to skim funds from any financial transaction. When the middlemen are sufficiently greedy, and when organizations’ budgets are sufficiently constrained, leaders choose not to fund attacks in equilibrium because the costs of skimming are too great. Further, we find important nonlinearities in terrorists’ response to government counter-terrorism. Given constrained funding for terrorists, government efforts yield few results until they reach a threshold, at which point cooperation between leaders and middlemen in terrorist groups breaks down, leading to dramatic drops in the probability of terrorist success.

Organizing for Destruction: Does Organizational Structure Affect Terrorist Group Behavior and Success?

Global Organized Terror: Emerging Relationships between Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups

Mumbai Attacks: A Case Study of Overlap Between Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups