1
Introduction
What is the rationale for rebels to kill civilians as a strategy of war? We know that
rebel groups commonly classified as terrorists or extremists kill civilians, e.g. Abu
Sayyaf in the Philippines or LRA in Uganda. But it also happens that seemingly
more “moderate” rebel groups, or so-called liberation movements that more clearly
seek the support of the people, target civilians, such as SPLA in Sudan or FARC in
Colombia. Taking a look at the now ongoing civil wars around the world, it becomes
clear that many rebel groups recurrently attack civilians while fighting the
government: in general rebel groups kill as many civilians as do governments.
1
Some
extensive studies have been conducted with the purpose of explaining government
violence against civilians in war, but very few have focused on the question why
rebel groups do so.
2
Considering the role of rebel groups in intrastate conflicts, it is
rather surprising that they choose such tactics. While the government is defending
its position as the legitimate authority of the state, the rebels enter the conflict with
the purpose of gaining something – either power of territorial control. Since they
strive for power, and consequently often seek the loyalty of the people for future
popular support in a post-conflict society, there should be high domestic audience
costs attached to targeting civilians. Moreover, the international community may
threaten to intervene in conflicts or in other ways sanction against a rebel group
when atrocities against the population are too severe, and therefore there should also
be international audience costs when killing civilians. Thus, it is quite puzzling that
rebel groups in some conflicts kill civilians to such a great extent as they do. I
propose that a fruitful way of understanding this phenomenon is to study the
dynamics of the conflict, since costly actions are likely to be strategic decisions
related to the ongoing conflict.
The purpose of the paper is to examine how targeting of civilians by rebel
groups is related to the conflict dynamics, specifically to the battlefield outcome. I
argue that the killing of civilians is used as a signal of resolve intended to affect the
overall bargaining process of the war. In bargaining theory of war it is commonly
stated that the fighting reveals information about the parties’ relative capabilities,
thereby decreasing the information gap. At the same time, other factors such as the
1
Based on figures by UCDP Human Security project for the years 1996-2003. The type of killings
measured here is direct and deliberate killings of civilians by rebel groups and governments that are
at the same time active in an intrastate armed conflict.
2
There is a substantial literature on terrorist groups, but few studies relate it specifically to armed
conflicts.
Convention