1
Introduction
Shortly after noon on February 26, 1993, approximately 1,500 lbs. of home-made
explosives were detonated on the second level of the World Trade Center parking
structure. Six people were killed and more than a thousand were injured. It could have
been much worse; the F-350 Econoline van rented by the terrorists had a cargo
capacity of over 4,000 lbs. Ramzi Yousef, the leader of the attack, did not have
enough money to purchase sufficient materials to build a larger bomb, according to
his trial testimony. He also claimed the attack was rushed because his cell ran out of
money.
businesses in Sudan were generating enough income to support thousands of
followers, run military training camps and provide large kickbacks to the Sudanese
Similar underfunding problems have plagued other international terrorist
organizations. Idris, the chief logistician for the 2002 Bali bombing, was arrested
three weeks after the bombing. The police tracked him down through his involvement
in a bank robbery intended to raise funds for subsequent operations. A detailed study
of the money sent to Idris to fund the Bali bombing reveals that he received much
more than he disbursed for that attack. This makes his subsequent involvement in
risky criminal activities that much more puzzling.
of financially strapped operatives working for terrorist organizations that seem to
have plenty of money. We seek to explain this pattern.
The puzzle for traditional perspectives on terrorist financial and logistical systems
.
is that groups which are purportedly organized to carry out attacks often provide
inadequate funds to their operatives. Standard accounts stress the efficiency with
2
Convention