18
true. While the UN is more likely to use force in conflicts in which at both disputants are
supporters of the international status quo, it also is more likely to respond to more drawn
out and more fatal disputes.
[Table 8 About Here]
Table 8 presents the predicted probabilities of UN action for Model 2. The
predicted probabilities allow a glimpse of the effect of independent variable s on the
probability of action under specific scenarios. The effect of different disputant types is
examined for a minimum dispute level, an average dispute level, and the maximum
dispute level in this sample.
17
The predicted probabilities illustrate that the use of force is
extremely unlikely in low- level disputes and in disputes between two democracies. The
use of force, however, is a virtual certainty when the most severe disputes occur. Not
surprisingly, this only the case for severe disputes between authoritarian and mixed
democratic dyads. The lack of cases of severe disputes between democracies leads to the
zero probability of the use of force. Thus, severe disputes, whether they occur between
authoritarian, mixed democratic, pro-, mixed-, or anti-status quo states are virtually
guaranteed to experience the use of force by the United Nations.
The UN also has a distinct, but low probability of using force in average level
conflicts between authoritarian states that support the status quo or have mixed
preferences for the status quo or for low- level conflicts between authoritarian states
which support the status quo. These pro-status quo ties to the international leader
likewise have the strongest effect on UN action short of the use of force. For minimum
and average dispute levels, disputes between two states that support the status quo are
always more likely to experience UN action short of the use of force. Likewise pro-status
17
The dispute level is determined by the Duration, Hostility, and Fatality variables.
Convention