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form associations and organizations based upon end uring preferences for the international
order (Organski, 1968; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Kugler & Lemke, 1996; Tammen et al.,
2000). Consequently, one would expect that state’s ties to this order should help to
predict the likelihood of actions by intergovernmental organizations. The functionalist
literature, in contrast, clearly posits that IGO actions are centered on upholding the
organizational goals of international peace and humanitarian interests.
These perspectives clearly differ in suggesting that IGO actions are driven by
either the goals of the organization or the preferences of the states which comprise the
organization. This paper thus examines whether IGO action is best predicted by, first, the
“rules” of the organizations or, second, a similarity of IGO member states’ and
combatants’ ties to the leader of the international order or a similarity of institutional
format.
Using a data set which provides information on the level of IGO actions on
international militarized disputes lasting longer than 24 hours in the 1984 to 1994 period,
I am able to examine the relative impact of conflict severity and IGO member and
disputant attributes on the probability of IGO involvement in international disputes.
While I find that IGOs, especially the UN, are often driven by organizational goals, their
actions are also predicted by members’ and combatants’ ties to the leader of the
international order.
PRIOR RESEARCH
A small body of qualitative work has developed over the last several decades on
IGOs and their role in international conflict (Martin and Simmons, 1998). Much of this
work has examined whether IGOs have any effect on international conflict. On the one
hand, realists suggest that IGOs are simply a reflection of power politics and thus have
little or no impact independent impact on international relations (Mearsheimer, 1995). In
Convention