of a social engineering project that confines religion to the private domain.
This typology helps
to explain different conceptions of secularism in my three cases.
My definitions of the two meanings of secularism point to two criteria to evaluate
whether a passive or active secularism is the dominant conception in a country. The first criterion
is the state constitution’s take of secularism as an established ideology or as a principle that
limits the state authority over religion. Both the French and Turkish constitutions identify their
particular state as “secular:” “France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic
(Article 2)” and “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State (Article 2).”
Yet, they do not define the limits of state intervention in the religious realm. In other words, the
French and Turkish constitutions point to secularism as an official ideology and an identity of the
state rather than as a functional legal principle delineating the relationship of the state to religion.
In the US, by contrast, the First Amendment to the Constitution does not identify the state as
secular. It simply states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” The first part of this statement, the
Establishment Clause, requires state neutrality towards religions, while the second part, the Free
Exercise Clause, maintains religious freedom. Both clauses restrict state authority. Moreover, the
First Amendment is a part of what is known as the Bill of Rights. This implies that secularism in
the US is primarily an issue of individual rights, rather than an established state ideology. These
8
Two scholars already discussed two types of secularism in their very insightful but short essays. Taylor examines
two modes of secularism with regard to their ontological bases. The first mode is normatively based on a “religious
common ground.” American secularism was an example of this mode. Its first common ground had been non-
denominational Protestantism; then, it depended on monotheism; finally, today, it lacks a religious common ground.
The second mode of secularism, according to Taylor, depends on the hegemony of a “political ethic independent of
religion.” This mode is very similar to assertive secularism in my terminology. Taylor 1999. The second scholar,
Wilfred McClay, uses the terms “negative” and “positive” conceptions of secularism. For him, the first conception
“is a minimal, even ‘negative’ understanding of secularism, as a freedom ‘from’ establishmentarian imposition.” For
him, negative secularism “is merely a provisional lingua franca that serves to facilitate commerce among different
kinds of belief, rather than establish some new “absolute” language, an Esperanto of postreligious truth.” The second
conception, however, “is more robust, more assertive, more ‘positive’ understanding of secularism…—the one that
affirms secularism as an ultimate faith….” McClay 2000, 63-64. Taylor’s and McClay’s condensed essays mainly
focus on the philosophical distinctions of the two types of secularism. My dissertation makes a contribution to the
literature by explaining these two types by a detailed comparative analysis of three contemporary cases.
5
Convention