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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42302_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Wittrock, Jill. "Parliaments and Cabinets in Post-Communist States: Does Bicameralism Matter?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42302_index.html>

Wittrock, J. N. , 2005-09-01 "Parliaments and Cabinets in Post-Communist States: Does Bicameralism Matter?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42302_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Traditionally, political scientists have modeled cabinet coalition formation and government behavior based on information from the lower chamber in a legislature. With approximately one-third of the world’s parliaments adopting a bicameral structure (Tsebelis and Money 1997), the empirical tendency to exclude an upper parliamentary chamber possibly overlooks the valuable impact it has on government formation and durability. Some scholars have started to examine the nature and relevance of upper legislative bodies, but most of this research has focused on Western European parliaments (for example: Bawn 1999, Druckman and Thies 2002, Heller 1997, and Tsebelis and Money 1997). In particular, Druckman and Thies have attempted to incorporate the impact of an upper chamber into the general theory of coalition behavior. They empirically tested the impact of the upper chamber on government durability and survival and also the influence on coalition-building on ten states in Western Europe. The goal of this paper is to apply the framework of Druckman and Thies’ article to post-communist states. Does the presence of an additional chamber influence coalition building in the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania (bicameral) more so than in a unicameral post-communist state (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia)? How does this additional chamber influence party behavior? Will parties form a super majority in the lower chamber in order to guarantee a majority in the upper? Does the presence of an additional chamber influence the durability and survival of a government coalition more than in unicameral systems? The paper explores these issues in an attempt to provide the first examination of the influence of upper chambers on the coalition-building theory as applied to post-communist states. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I explore the literature on coalition theory generally and its applicability to post-communist Europe. Because a relevant number of post-communist states have adopted a bicameral system, I expect this should matter in the government formation process. Second, I collect data on: (1) support for coalitions in both chambers to test whether government formation and survival varying significantly from bicameral to unicameral legislatures, and (2) cabinet compositions. The information is gathered from country-specific sources because a comprehensive data set does not exist on post-communist cabinet formations and upper chamber compositions. With the data sets, I will test: (1) if the government formed included surplus parties in the lower chamber to achieve a majority in the upper chamber, (2) the relative strengths of the governments in both chambers, and (3) how upper chambers in post-communist states affect cabinet durability and survival.

Unintended Impact of External Institution Promotion: The Polarization of Political Party System in Central, East and Southeast Europe

EU Federalism and the New Members from Central and Eastern Europe: Institutional Impact upon National Political Systems and Governance