39
may be a strategic preference, given that the MSI has also deviated rightwards in the
same time period. Since we do not have enough clue to regard this case as
accommodation, I still refer to is as preemption.
The Communist Party does not make a radical switch, but it is obvious that
authoritarian themes in party’s program expand slightly throughout the 1980s and the
early 1990s. The steep upward movement of the Christian Democrats (DC) in 1994
cannot regarded as a rightward movement due to the radical institutional changes in the
Italian party system in between these years, which makes it almost impossible to compare
the same party in 1992 and in 1994. Finally, once Forza Italia (FI) moves rightwards in
1996 and becomes the right-most party in Austria. Considering that the LN and AN
achieved their first best in 1992 and 1994 respectively, and the fact that the FI
incorporated both of them in a coalition government after the 1994 elections, the FI’s
rightward move from 1994 to 1996 might be a strategic action to appeal to a group of
authoritarian, conservative, or market-liberal voters, the target groups of several right-
wing parties, including the extremist ones. Nevertheless, the post-1996 pattern of the FI
should be observed to decide whether this is a longtime pattern-wise movement or a
deviance. Finally and interestingly, the Northern League (LN) is moderate on the
authoritarianism scale and does not show any pattern of radicalization.
Overall, every party except for the LN seems to turn more authoritarian since
1983 at different rates. During the mid-1990s, the right-extremist Alleanza Nazionale
(AN) and LN seem to be more moderate than the Christian Democrats. At this period, the
right-authoritarian space in Italy is occupied not by the ERPs but rather by the Christian
Democrats (DC) and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia.