6
influence, if not the electoral performance, of the extreme right. Similarly, the attitude of
the political elite and established parties toward an ERP may affect its political relevance.
If the existing parties collaborate with the extreme right by adopting its issue positions or
incorporating them in governments, they significantly contribute to the legitimization of
the ERPs in society. If they create a ‘cordon sanitaire’ by refraining from any cooperation
with the ERPs on local and national level, they instead marginalize them and undermine
their legitimacy. The National Alliance and Northern League of Italy and Freedom Party
of Austria are both collaborated by the mainstream right in their countries, and they are
not severely restricted in legal terms. Therefore, their recently growing vote shares have
actually helped them participate in government and, in turn, shape public policy. The
Vlaams Blok (VB) of Belgium, however, faced a non-accommodating political elite
(cordon sanitaire), and has recently been banned by the Belgian Supreme Court. For a
party like the VB, then, electoral success does not really matter.
Another example of political opportunity structure is provided by Kitschelt’s
‘supply-side’ explanation for the growth of the extreme right. Whether a successful ERP
emerges depends on the existing party competition in a democracy (Kitschelt 1995, 14).
The strategies of the major parties of the moderate right and (to some extent) moderate
left have significant consequences for the electoral opportunity of the ERPs. If the main
party of the moderate right moves away from the center of politics further to the right as a
result of, for instance, centrifugal party competition, it provides a credible alternative to
the ERPs and captures the support of right-wing authoritarian voters. In contrast, if a
moderate right-wing party moves closer to the political center and remains there for a
long period as a result of a centripetal tendency, right-wing voters identify the party with
Convention