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INTRODUCTION
In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian economist settled in the USA,
published his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, analyzing and evaluating the
inevitability of socialism. Schumpeter, a reactionary aristocrat at best, did not welcome
socialism, but even less did he welcome popular democracy. A few chapters of his book
offered a debunking redefinition of democracy, a construction intended to preserve elite
domination in the unwelcome socialist democracies of the future. In the name of realism,
his definition stripped democracy of all ethical content. Schumpeter’s redefinition, shorn
of its dark origins, became canonical among the postwar behavioralists and then the
rational-choicers regnant in the American political science profession.
The book . . . has had an “extraordinary impact” on Anglo-American political science
and theory during the last half century . . . . Scholars have learned from Schumpeter
to define democracy as a “method” or “institutional arrangement” for arriving at
political decisions, to identify democracy with “competitive leadership” and “the rule
of the politician” rather than mass participation and popular rule, and to decouple the
discussion of democracy from any set of ends or values . . . .Even figures who loom
large in political science in their own right have been almost eulogistic in
acknowledging Schumpeter’s influence. (Medearis 2001, )
There is much critical discussion of Schumpeter’s democratic theory.
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Much of that
discussion provides useful context, which I shall assume in this essay; and there is also
some excellent criticism. In earlier work (Mackie 2003), I tried to restore intellectual
respectability to the idea of the public good, and in this essay I shamelessly bring the
public good back into democratic theory.
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The considerable literature is ably referenced by Medearis (2001). I will only
mention those works I found especially useful. Medearis is comprehensive and rich with
insight. Scheuerman’s ( 1999, 183-207) essay on Schmitt and Schumpeter is also
required reading, both excellent and disturbing. I find Manin (1987, 1997) best at
confronting Schumpeter’s arguments. Pateman (1970) shows that Schumpeter’s account
of the “classical doctrine” is grossly mistaken. Ricci (1970) explains the relation of
Schumpeter to the American behavioralists. Bellamy (1991), Held (1997, 157-198),
Mitchell (1984), and Plamenatz (1972) were also of help to me. My work is indebted to
these scholars.
Convention