9
Democracy might be defined as rule by the people, but Schumpeter rejects that
definition. His first objection is that the scope of the enfranchised citizenry historically
has varied across nominally democratic regimes. Some democracies exclude slaves, or
the propertyless, or those of a certain religion or ethnicity, or women, and exclude
children. If children are excluded on the grounds of incompetence, he insists, then it must
be legitimate to exclude other groups on the grounds of incompetence. We must leave it
to every people to define itself, he concludes, adding that “this inescapable conclusion is
usually evaded by introducing additional assumptions into the theory of the democratic
process” (245). His first objection does not withstand examination. For one thing,
Schumpeter neglects the fact that limited franchise in nominal democracies was
sometimes justified on the (spurious) democratic argument that the enfranchised would
better represent the interests of the unenfranchised. Further, the classic sixfold
classification of regimes is still useful: rule is by one, by a few, or by the many, either on
behalf of the rulers or on behalf of all. Alternatively, we can count regimes as more
democratic or less democratic, depending on the scope of enfranchisement. Schumpeter
would obliterate these useful distinctions. If the enfranchised citizenry constitutes itself,
then a monarchy or an oligarchy would constitute a democracy, according to his
reasoning. Schumpeter, in his debunking zeal, contradicts himself here. A bit earlier he
tells us that “it is naïve to believe that the democratic process completely ceases to work
in an autocracy or that an autocrat never wishes to act according to the will of the people”
(241); in this passage, democracy means the will of the whole people, not just that of the
enfranchised electorate. More tellingly, in modern democracy there is an ineluctable
trend to extend franchise to the limit. Such extension seems to be part of the inner logic
of democracy, and not the product of some additional assumption. Freedom and equality
are not added to democracy, they are its basis.
His second objection is that it is not technically possible for the people to rule.
Our object of study is modern representative democracy. He restricts the term “rule by
Convention