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white American of whom it is true that at the time of emancipation all of his or her ancestors were
slave owners loyal to the Union?
That Mill would think that the state should compensate both the freed slaves and their
former owners following emancipation might seem paradoxical. One can imagine other cases,
though, where a similar answer might be reached. An example with enough detail to make the
analogy close might be lengthy, but here is a general outline of one form examples might take.
Suppose that you promise a friend to help them in some kind of ongoing activity. Initially you see
nothing morally problematic about what the two of you are doing, but later you realize that it is
morally unacceptable and that someone is being harmed by it. You break your promise to provide
further help, and because of her reliance on your initial promise your friend is now harmed by
your withdrawal. In such a case you might well have an obligation to compensate whomever it
was that you and your friend were hurting. Even if you were right to break your promise,
however, you might also have an obligation to make it up to your friend in some way.
Conclusion
We have seen now how the three themes mentioned at the outset figure into Mill’s
utilitarian critique of slavery. Mill thinks that nothing matters more to a society’s prospects for
happiness than the level of moral and intellectual development that its members have attained. He
is willing to admit that there are certain things that can be said in favor of slavery from an
“educational” standpoint, and that in some situations its use might be justified on the grounds that
it will help a society on the lowest rung of the developmental ladder to make a small amount of
progress. It has so many negative ethological consequences, however, that more advanced
Convention