Deliberative Civility
James Bohman
Saint Louis University
The ideal of deliberative democracy seems to require at least two broadly civic
virtues related to the conduct of deliberation: toleration and civility. For some of its
defenders, deliberation requires conversational restraint or the method of avoidance, in
which contentious issues are left off the agenda; deliberation can thereby maximize
agreement and minimize conflict.
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For its critics, this sort of principle suggests that
deliberative democracy can only be conducted by polite and calm conversation rather
than through sharp rhetoric and righteous indignation. However, such a distinctly liberal
interpretation of civility is neither the only one possible, nor even distinctly deliberative.
In the circumstances of “deep” pluralism (that is, of pluralism along a number of
overlapping and intersecting dimensions), civility and toleration must be more plausibly
interpreted if they are to remain part of a feasible ideal of public reason. Because
deliberation demands the critical engagement of citizens with each, attempting to avoid
and minimize disagreement is too minimal to meet the demands of for cooperative and
yet engaged deliberation. Given the need for what Frank Michelman calls “full blast” of
diverse public opinion, is the rough and tumble of lively political debates the only way to
assure publicity? Or, would it drown out “the mild voice of reason” and undermine
mutual trust and the spirit of compromise?
Many recent criticisms of deliberative democracy see it as demanding the
discipline of a polite, calm and constrained conversation among “reasonable” persons.
Rawls seems to offer just such an interpretation of the “duty of civility” when he
discusses it in the context of “offering arguments to others.” Accordingly, civility is part
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Convention