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In choosing what form of life to lead, Sen argues, a person chooses
among vectors of co-realizable functionings including, for example, the
states of (i) being well (or poorly) nourished; (ii) being free from (or
subject to) disease; and (iii) having access to clean (or polluted) air.
One vector might involve remaining in an country A, in which malaria is
not well controlled; a second set might involve migration to a country B
which has implemented more effective policies to control the spread of
disease. The introduction by country A of an epidemiological policy that
effectively reduced the incidence of malaria would, however, change the
content of the person’s capability set. The set would now contain a new
realizable combination of functionings, one allowing the person to remain
in country A without serious risk of malaria.
Implementation of the policy would not improve the ability of
affected persons to choose among individual functionings. The person
would not, as Cohen observes, be provided with the freedom to choose
between ’life without malaria’ and ’life with malaria.’ Nevertheless,
implementation of the policy would increase the person’s freedom by
changing the contents of the person’s capability set, in particular, by
replacing an undesireable vector of functionings with a desireable
vector.
Since Cohen assumes that Sen’s account is designed to realize
freedom of choice over individual functionings, his objections mistake
the focus of Sen’s argument. As a result, his arguments fail to offer a
compelling critique of Sen’s notion of effective freedom. Even if Cohen
argued persuasively that the strong and weak interpretations, as applied
to choice among individual functionings, both failed to describe a form
of freedom without control, Cohen’s critique would not establish that
Sen’s notion of effective freedom fails to describe such a form of
freedom.
Convention