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Should freedom constitute a fundamental concern for egalitarians?
Amartya Sen argues that the answer to this question is yes; ensuring the
freedom to choose what form of life to lead constitutes a goal of central
importance for a theory of egalitarian justice. In order to judge how
well a person is doing, Sen argues, an egalitarian theory requires an
assessment of the degree to which the person is free to choose what form
of life to lead.
The priority assigned to freedom in Sen’s account of equality of
capabilities remains one of the theory’s most controversial features.
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In
overestimating the place of freedom among egalitarian concerns, critics
argue, capabilities theory distorts fundamental egalitarian intuitions.
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The concerns of egalitarian justice, it is argued, are satisfied if each
person possesses the appropriate share of social goods, regardless of the
level of freedom that they enjoy (Cohen 1993, 28).
Sen responds that freedom is of central concern for egalitarian
thought because it affects both the nature and the significance of a
person’s condition. For example, Sen notes, "[fasting involves an
abstention from eating that goes beyond just starving" (Sen 1985b, 202).
In order to characterize the degree of well-being that the faster enjoys
accurately, it is necessary to take note of the set of options over which
the faster enjoyed the freedom to choose. This consideration, Sen
asserts, is essentially relevant to assessing the well-being aspect of
the person.
Philip Pettit has recently offered an elaboration of Sen’s response
to his critics (Pettit 2001). Sen’s emphasis on freedom, Pettit argues,
is motivated by the view that well-being that is enjoyed only at the
discretion of the powerful is less valuable than well-being that is not
favor-dependent. A state in which persons enjoy a high standard of
living only by "adopting an ingratiating attitude towards the potentate"
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