28
would choose" (Sugden 2003, 791).
9.
See Kukathas (1993) pp. 536-37 for a helpful account of the
distinction between opportunity and exercise accounts of freedom.
10.
One controversial interpretation of MacCallum’s concept of freedom
would provide that freedom requires, not merely the absence of
constraints, but effective power over them. See Schneider 1940;
Sherover 1984. Such a view would represent the exercise view as a
particular conception of MacCallum’s concept. This argument has not
been generally accepted, however, since effective power appears to
constitute, not an interpretation of the MacCallum’s concept of
freedom, but "a condition for its more effective utilization" (Gray
1991, 46; see Parent 1974; Berlin 1969, 125-26).
11.
"Under equality of resources,...people decide what sort of lives to
pursue against a background of information about the actual cost their
choices impose on other people" (Dworkin, 2000, 69). The level of
opportunity to implement these decisions is defined by the share of
resources available to the person; and the shares of resources
available to each person as he or she takes part in this
"institutionalized form of the process of discovery and
adaptation...should be equal" (70).
12.
Dworkin also rejects the argument that Bob has "a greater second-
order or ‘complex’ capacity" than Anne (137) on the grounds that such
a claim must rely on a welfare metric. Yet this claim is not
obviously decisive. Rawls argues plausibly, on non-welfarist grounds,
for the claim that persons who achieve more complex careers achieve a
greater good.
Convention