2
is, Pettit urges, "repellent to ordinary sensibility." Thus, Sen’s
critics "appear to overlook the importance of enjoying favour-
independently decisive preference in matters of functioning" (Pettit
2001, 21-13).
While this argument is persuasive on its own terms, however,
Pettit=s argument neither: (i) responds fully to the objections raised by
Sen’s critics; nor (ii) reflects the entire range of Sen’s concerns.
Pettit’s defense focuses almost exclusively on the objection that Sen’s
emphasis on freedom leads to an unacceptably "athletic" conception of
freedom. Pettit therefore fails to respond to the influential objections
that Sen’s approach: (i) distorts basic egalitarian intuitions; and (ii)
fails to provide a plausible account of freedom. In addition, Sen has
expressed reservations about Pettit’s suggestion that capabilities
equality=s emphasis on freedom is motivated by a concern regarding favor-
dependence (Sen 2001). I will argue that Sen is motivated primarily by
the more general intuition that the degree to which a state of being was
freely achieved affects the nature and significance of the well-being
realized in that state.
In order to develop this argument, I will first outline the basic
elements of Sen’s account of capabilities equality, emphasizing Sen’s
incorporation of the notion of freedom to choose what form of life to
lead as an important dimension of his metric of equality. Second, I will
evaluate G. A. Cohen’s objections that Sen’s approach: (i) unduly narrows
the scope of egalitarian concerns; (ii) requires an unattractively
athletic conception of equality; and (iii) fails to provide a compelling
account of freedom. After rejecting these arguments, I will argue that
in incorporating information regarding the actual opportunities that
persons have, capabilities theory expands the descriptive and analytic
range of egalitarian theory.
Convention