38
Press, 1987), 204. Habermas accuses Derrida, among other “postmodern” thinkers, of
foregrounding the rhetorical capacity of language over its problem-solving capacity.
24
Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 26. Hereafter cited in the text as RP.
25
Arendt, The Human Condition, 171.
26
“‘The picture forces itself on us […].’ It is very interesting that pictures do force
themselves on us. And if that were not so, how could such a sentence as ‘What’s done cannot be
undone’ mean anything to us?” (RFM, I §14). Wittgenstein gives a close reading of the picture of
“the machine as symbol,” which lies at the origin of the language game of logical necessity, our
sense of the “logical must” (Ibid., I, §121-122).
27
Ernesto Grassi, Die unerhörte Metapher (Frankfurt am Main: Anton Hain, 1992), 29.
28
“This necessity is of a special kind. It is not a theoretical objective necessity, allowing
us to cognize a priori that everyone will feel this liking for the object I call beautiful. Nor is it a
practical objective necessity, where, through concepts of a pure rational will that serves freely
acting beings as a rule, this liking is the necessary consequence of an objective law and means
nothing other than that one absolutely (without any further aim) ought to act in a certain way”
(Kant, CJ §18, p. 85).
29
Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 26.
30
See Kant, CJ §34, p. 149. See also Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 88.
31
Jean-François Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime (Kant’s “Critique of
Judgment,” §§23-29), trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
Lyotard finds in Kantian judgments of taste a resistance to reaching consensus through the giving
Convention