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and talk of what the miscreants deserve, is retribution. Diodotus, by contrast, provides a
quasi-utilitarian deterrence-based, forward-looking justification. So the contrast between
Cleon and Diodotus would not simply be one between arguments on the basis of justice
and advantage, but between two different conceptions of (punitive) justice, one
retributive and the other deterrence-based. So the justice to which Cleon refers and
which Diodotus disavows, is retribution. If this is correct, then part of the genius of
Diodotus’ argument would be that by exploiting the justice-advantage antithesis, he is
able to make an argument for the former on the basis of the latter. By making an
argument that ties the raison d’etre of all punishment to deterrence, Diodotus is able to
make a moral argument while disavowing appeals to justice.
Consider next a passage from the depiction of stasis at Corcyra. Here,
Thucydides, speaking in propria persona, uses a good deal of undisguised moral censure
in characterizing the breakdown of the normative order at Corcyra (and other states that
fell into a condition of stasis). Speaking of their acts of retribution or vengeance, he says,
“In their acts of vengeance (tas timôrias) they went to even greater lengths, not stopping
at what justice (tou dikaiou) or the interest of the state (têi polei sumphorou) demanded,
but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard.” (3.82) The acts of
vengeance (tas timôrias) – the same word used by Cleon in reference to the Mytileneans
– which are made coordinate with “most terrible deeds,” are contrasted with justice and
what is advantageous for the city. That is, according to Thucydides, punishment should
be limited both by justice and advantage. Justice might mean, at the very least, that only
the guilty should suffer punishment, that punishment should not be indiscriminate or
excessive in relation to the crime; advantage would mean that the punishment should also
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