Author's Keywords: bargaining model, pork barrel legislation, collective goods, term limits, divid-the-dollar games	Convention All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59268_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Volden, Craig. and Wiseman, Alan. "Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59268_index.html>

Volden, C. and Wiseman, A. E. , 2004-09-02 "Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59268_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: We develop a sequential bargaining model in which a legislature governed by majority rule divides a budget among its members into both particularistic and collective goods. We find, among other things, that legislators tend to provide particularistic rather than collective goods when they do not heavily discount the future, when coalition formation is easy, and when the legislature is small. The amount spent on collective goods is a nonlinear function of such factors as the relative value of collective goods investments, the size of the legislature, and the degree of legislative patience. And legislatures confronting both collective and particularistic spending options will vary in their preferences for open and closed amendment rules in understandable ways. In sum, our results provide a unified picture of bargaining in legislatures over pork barrel and general welfare legislation.

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Intra-Party Politics, Electoral Rules, Electoral Cohesiveness, and the Provision of Particularistic and Public Goods in Parliamentary Democracies