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Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods
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Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods
Craig Volden
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Alan E. Wiseman
Department of Political Science
The Ohio State University
Abstract
We develop a sequential bargaining model in which a legislaturegoverned by majority rule divides a budget among its membersinto both particularistic and collective goods. We find, amongother things, that legislators tend to provide particularistic ratherthan collective goods when they do not heavily discount the future,when coalition formation is easy, and when the legislature is small.The amount spent on collective goods is a nonlinear function ofsuch factors as the relative value of collective goods investments,the size of the legislature, and the degree of legislative patience.And legislatures confronting both collective and particularisticspending options will vary in their preferences for open and closedamendment rules in understandable ways. In sum, our resultsprovide a unified picture of bargaining in legislatures over porkbarrel and general welfare legislation.
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Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-
September 5, 2004, Chicago, IL. Copyright by the American Political Science Association. We thank RomanIvanchenko for valuable research assistance. Please send questions and comments to: Alan E. Wiseman,Department of Political Science, 2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH,43210-1373, or email (wiseman.## email not listed ##).
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| | Authors: Volden, Craig. and Wiseman, Alan. |
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Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods
Alan E. Wiseman
Department of Political Science
The Ohio State University
Abstract
We develop a sequential bargaining model in which a legislature
governed by majority rule divides a budget among its members
into both particularistic and collective goods. We find, among
other things, that legislators tend to provide particularistic rather
than collective goods when they do not heavily discount the future,
when coalition formation is easy, and when the legislature is small.
The amount spent on collective goods is a nonlinear function of
such factors as the relative value of collective goods investments,
the size of the legislature, and the degree of legislative patience.
And legislatures confronting both collective and particularistic
spending options will vary in their preferences for open and closed
amendment rules in understandable ways. In sum, our results
provide a unified picture of bargaining in legislatures over pork
barrel and general welfare legislation.
*
Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-
September 5, 2004, Chicago, IL. Copyright by the American Political Science Association. We thank Roman
Ivanchenko for valuable research assistance. Please send questions and comments to: Alan E. Wiseman,
Department of Political Science, 2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH,
43210-1373, or email (wiseman.## email not listed ##).
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