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provide for both particularistic and collective goods policies? Third, what accounts for the
variation in collective goods provided by the legislature? Fourth, how do the benefits that accrue
to the proposer change as the value of the collective good increases vis-à-vis the value of
particularistic goods? Fifth, what legislative rules will be selected by a legislature confronting
both collective and particularistic policies?
Allowing legislators to allocate spending for both public and pork barrel purposes, our
model establishes the following. First, collective goods policies are not implemented when
legislators place a much higher value on particularistic policies, when the rate of return for the
collective good is low, when legislators are patient, and when the legislature is relatively small.
Second, we see that legislation combining particularistic and collective goods is passed when
legislators place moderate values on the production of both kinds of policies. Even in these
cases, however, we only observe the legislative proposer receiving particularistic benefits in
addition to the collective benefit. Third, we find that the actual size of the collective good is
highly responsive to the relative value of the collective policy vis-à-vis particularistic goods, the
rate of return on the collective investment, legislators’ patience, and the size of the legislature.
Fourth, we find that when only particularistic policies are passed, a benefit of proposal power is
increasing in the relative value of the particularistic good vis-à-vis the collective. Where both
particularistic and collective policies are passed, however, the opposite can hold true. Finally,
although legislatures providing only particularistic goods prefer closed rules, legislature prefer
open amendment rules when considering legislation that simultaneously combines collective and
particularistic purposes.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the relevant
literature, and note how our approach to this problem deviates from the prevailing works. We
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