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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59309_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Adams, James. and Merrill, Samuel, III. "Candidate Equilibrium and the Behavioral Model of Voter Choice and Turnout: Theoretical Results and Empirical Tests" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59309_index.html>

Adams, J. and Merrill, S. , 2004-09-02 "Candidate Equilibrium and the Behavioral Model of Voter Choice and Turnout: Theoretical Results and Empirical Tests" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59309_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: We present theoretical results that when voters are motivated by policy distance and partisan loyalties, and voters are prepared to abstain from alienation, then office-seeking candidates’ equilibrium positions in two-candidate contests diverge, with each candidate presenting policies that reflect the beliefs of her partisan constituency. We report empirical tests on U.S. Senate elections which support the central predictions derived from our model: namely, that Senate candidates’ policy divergence from the mean state voter position increases with the size and the extremity of their state partisan constituencies, and, crucially, that candidates gain votes as they shift away from the center of the policy space, in the direction of their constituencies. Our analyses also uncover support for recent theories of policy competition put forward by Miller and Schofield, Moon, and Callander and Wilkie.

Political Parties and Elections: A Comparative Examination of the Republican and Democrat Party in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana

Move to the Center or Mobilize the Base? Effects of Political Competition, Voter Turnout, and Partisan Loyalties on the Ideological Convergence of Vote-Maximizing Candidates in Two-Party Competition