Author's Keywords: Adversarial committee, Condorcet Jury Theorem, Information aggregation, Minority-dominance proofness	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59319_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Kim, Jaehoon. "A Model of Adversarial Committees" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59319_index.html>

Kim, J. , 2004-09-02 "A Model of Adversarial Committees" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59319_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: We generalize the Condorcet Jury Theorem to an environment where each voter has private information about the true state of the world and two groups of voters have opposing statecontingent preferences. We show that in equilibrium under unanimity rule, the probability of making a wrong choice for the majority-type voters is bounded below and above. Under any non-unanimous rule, we show that in a large electorate, if the majority-type voters are attentive to their private information, and the fraction of the majority-type voters is greater than the fraction of votes required to pass the alternative, then the probability of choosing the correct alternative from the majority-type voter’s perspective gets close to one, as in the case of preference aggregation in complete information. Otherwise, non-unanimous voting rules (except for simple majority rule) fail to aggregate information. Finally we show that only simple majority rule is minority-dominance proof.

The Voter ID Mess: Estimating the Effects of State Voter ID laws on Voter Turnout and Self-Reported Voting Irregularities

The Signal of Gender: The Impact of Electoral Rules on the Voters' Use of Gender-Based Information Shortcuts