Author's Keywords: market power, international regulation, securities, data privacy	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59408_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Bach, David. and Newman, Abraham. "Effective Market Power: the domestic institutional roots of international market regulation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59408_index.html>

Bach, D. and Newman, A. , 2004-09-02 "Effective Market Power: the domestic institutional roots of international market regulation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59408_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: International market regulation has become a critical determinant of corporate and national economic fortunes. Understanding how jurisdictions exert influence over international market rules thus becomes crucial for scholars, business leaders, and policymakers alike. In this paper, we critically examine the widely accepted claim that domestic market size is the principal determinant of market power and international regulatory influence. We contrast this argument with a perspective stressing the crucial role of domestic political and regulatory institutions. Existing work pays too much attention on material aspects of domestic markets – size, scope, and market share – and underestimates the role of regulatory institutions in which domestic markets are embedded. These institutions are the missing link between latent market power vested in market size, and effective market power rooted in domestic regulatory capacity. We evaluate hypotheses from the market size and effective market power perspectives in two vital areas of international market regulation – securities and personal information. Initial evidence underscores the crucial role of domestic institutions and regulatory capacity for international market regulation.

Creating and Maintaining a European Security Institution: Distribution of Power, International Norms and Domestic Political Parties

Domestic Influences on International Politics: Global Policy Challenges and the Politics of Europe and the United States