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Abstract
In this paper, I will argue, contrary to previous studies of comparative economic voting
(Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999), that it is possible to observe
economic voting independent of the context of clarity of responsibility. I will also
respond to Whitten and Palmer’s claim that economic voting will only be observable
when considering the “unexpected” changes in the economy. Using Whitten and Palmer’s
Comparative Political Economy data set and a second expanded data set that includes 41
parliamentary and presidential democracies, I will show that independent of the clarity of
responsibility context, a bad economic performance will lower the probability of
reelection of the incumbent party. This holds for both parliamentary and presidential
regimes. I will contend that some of the failed attempts to find economic voting in
comparative settings are due to incorrect specifications of the vote function. I will argue
that better measurements of the economic variables, which reflect voters’ economic
evaluations more accurately, are necessary. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I will
claim that voters are sophisticated when judging economic performance. They evaluate
different economic variables in different ways. When necessary, they take the past into
account. Other times, they only consider recent economic information, and vote
myopically. Their length of vision will depend on which economic variable they are
evaluating.
Convention