Berk and Galvan, Field Guide to Creative Syncretism
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disappear--they take their struggles to new arenas; and multiple and incongruous institutions
result in change-making conflicts in the midst of stability.
Orren and Skowronek call the temporal disordering institutions “intercurrence.” In a world of
multiple institutions, created at different times for different purposes, it is inevitable that
authorities will collide and “standards of legitimacy abrade.” As a result, political purposes will
multiply and “crowd in” on one another. Institutions will “fall short of their goals, new goals
[will] be specified, and more institutions…created.” It is unlikely, then, complementary forms
will populate that polity and the sharp distinction between periods of stability and disorder will
blur. (O &S, 2002, 748)
Studies in this vein have done an excellent job of charting the dysfunctions and failures of
government, as it is difficult to set clear standards of performance or steer activity to achieving
them. Where scholars find stable and effective institutions, it is likely that government officials
are actively managing the “boundaries and jurisdictions of the different institutions they inhabit.
That is to say, multiple orders may work in tandem so long as the endemic problems of
coordination they present are effectively addressed.” (O&S, 2002, 75) More often than not,
difficulties continue to engender change.
Where Orren and Skowronek tend to stress the dysfunctions of institutional multiplicity, others
have shown how the disordering features of institutions can be the source of successful
adaptation. Intervening in the debate over path dependency, Crouch and Farrell (2003) and
Thelen (2000) argue that despite increasing returns to repetitive behavior, actors can choose to
get off an historical path when its rewards tail off. Building on Brian Arthur’s economic model
of path dependency, Crouch and Farrell posit a model in which actors have routine opportunities
assess how well their behavior matches the environment. As the environment changes, so too
will the rewards of staying with past choices (that is, staying on the path). But there are costs to
change: institutional actors must search for alternatives, whose consequences are not well
known. Still, it is not impossible to choose an alternative path and actors will do so if the
expected rewards outweigh the expected costs of change. This will depend not only on the
difference, but also the extent to which actors discount the future over the present and the
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