As events in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate, occupations confront both
opportunities and obstacles in their pursuit of democratic nation-building. On the one
hand, military conquest would appear to be a promising moment for the wholesale
transformation of political, social, and economic institutions. During the initial post-
surrender period, the victor often enjoys both a geopolitical opportunity and a unity of
purpose to rebuild a shattered nation; in some cases, military action itself is justified by
the promise of postwar reconstruction or regime change. Occupation forces also confront
specific challenges that may require broad and ambitious interventions ranging from
economic stabilization to refugee relief, a task made easier by hierarchical military
control and limited opposition to occupation initiatives. Indeed, conquest and occupation
is precisely the kind of exogenous shock social scientists often identify with critical
junctures and other sharp discontinuities in the trajectory of a nation’s political
development (Collier and Collier 2002).
As occupations wear on, however, obstacles to nation-building become more
apparent. As the initial glow of victory wears off, enthusiasm for wholesale institutional
creation may give way to a more immediate concern for the functional rehabilitation of
existing structures. Moreover, even when occupation forces enjoy complete control over
the formal instruments of power, they still depend on variously endowed local interests
and institutions for the implementation of programs and policies. Obstacles ranging from
linguistic and cultural barriers to foot-dragging and more overt forms of resistance can
undermine occupation initiatives. For these reasons, occupations ultimately confront
lingering elements of the ancien regime.
Convention