The promise and peril of nation-building begs the question: what are the limiting
conditions on occupation as a force for social and political change? Previous studies
have focused on how the broader geopolitical context, prewar economic and political
legacies of the conquered nation, or the administrative structures of occupation
authorities impact postwar reconstruction (Dobbins et al. 2003. See also Lammers 1988
and Liberman 1993). Although these are important factors, we focus on an additional
source of constraint: the interplay of domestic political forces within the occupying
nation. Specifically, we argue that occupations do not occur within a political vacuum
but are shaped by the push and pull of organized interests as they are expressed though
representative institutions back home. Consequently, the limits of occupation will be set
in part by the degree to which domestic interest groups can successfully oppose specific
occupation policies.
As a case study of occupation politics, we examine the impact of domestic U.S.
interest groups on the American occupation of Japan after World War II. From 1945 to
1952, American military and civilian officials promoted a range of political, economic,
and social reforms in postwar Japan. In light of recent nation-building efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, some analysts and policymakers have looked to Japan as a model for
postwar reconstruction and democratization from above. According to a recent RAND
study of “best practices in nation building,” for example, the occupation of Japan “set
standards for postconflict transformation that have not yet been equaled” (Dobbins et al.
2003). Although far-reaching changes did take place during the occupation, historians
present a more complex picture of the period that challenges this analogy between Japan
and contemporary nation-building efforts. Impinging Cold War realities, a diversity of
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Convention