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they must come to understand that they are members of a larger community. The
imperatives of universal reason are not enough to make the developed world sacrifice
their prosperity for the sake of strangers in the developing world. Rorty points to an
unhelpful confusion between justice and loyalty. Justice, he contends, is simply loyalty
to a larger and more inclusive community than the family, the village, the tribe, or the
nation. But, according to Rorty’s liberal nationalism, that community does not really
exist, although we may imagine it does or wish, somehow, it could.
So why is it that the responsibilities and competencies of global citizens are
practically inconceivable? Part of the reason, I think, is that people feel ill-prepared and
unequipped to deal with problems on an international or global scale. Indeed, they may
feel powerless, incompetent, and unequipped to deal with problems on a national or local
scale, too. Yet, another part of the reason is that people do not understand how their own
choices and conduct contribute directly or indirectly to global (or national or local)
problems. Some of this may be willful denial. But much of it is due to the genuine
complexity of the problems themselves.
Why is this significant? I suspect that many people unconsciously base their
responsibilities on their capabilities, at least approximately. The more capabilities one
possesses the greater one’s responsibilities are perceived to be; the less capabilities one
possesses, the fewer one’s responsibilities are perceived to be. This results in two
interesting phenomena. First, a disincentive to acquiring new civic capabilities is created,
since new capabilities would convey with them new responsibilities. And second, a
disincentive is created to investigate and understand the interconnectedness of the world
and the ways in which individual conduct and choices contribute to global problems.
Convention