FEDERALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL
Abstract
Most of the literature on federalism has emphasized the relationship between national and
subnational governments, but has overlooked the organization of power at the subnational
level. Likewise, most of the debate on the separation of powers in presidential,
parliamentary, and mixed systems has neglected the role of federalism in bolstering the
separation of powers. In this paper, we argue federalism may be defined as a constitutional
arrangement that creates executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government at the
subnational level. This definition has important implications for the literatures on federalism
and the separation of powers, two themes often treated in isolation. First, it directs the
attention of students of federalism to the neglected subject of the separation of powers at the
subnational level. Second, it directs the attention of students of the separation of powers to
the issue of federalism. We show that the existence of institutional mechanisms that override
the subnational separation of powers in federal systems is problematic for democracy and
deserves further attention. We also point to the fact that by safeguarding the subnational
separation of powers, federalism can strengthen democracy at the national level.
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Convention