6
Bruce A. Ackerman, "Neo-federalism?" in Constitutionalism and Democracy, J. Elster and
R. Slagstad, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 170.
7
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law. Penelope Bullock and Joseph Raz, eds. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
8
An earlier literature in political science attempted to use Montesquieu’s separation of
powers but eliminate its doctrinaire elements. For example, Gabriel Almond argued that
rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication are features of all political systems. See
his “Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics,” in Almond and
Coleman, eds. The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1960), p. 17. Indeed, the idea that all constitutions have deliberative, executive, and judicial
features can be traced back to Aristotle’s Politics.
9
Max Weber, Economy and Society, Volume 1, G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds. (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p. 282.
10
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Article 16, states: “A society in
which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no
constitution at all.”
11
As Kant put it, the three elements of a constitution—legislatoria, rectoria, judiciaria—
complement each other to complete the constitution of the state and ensure its autonomy.
Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of
Jurisprudence as the Science of Right. [Translated by W. Hastie]. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1887) p. 170.
12
The point that the US model is not necessarily the best for all countries is well made by
Alfred Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model” in Amoretti and
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Convention