subnational level. Second, it directs the attention of students of the constitutional separation
of powers to the issue of federalism. Most of the debate on the separation of powers in
presidential, parliamentary, and mixed systems has neglected the role of federalism in
bolstering the separation of powers.
The intuition behind our definition is that the separation of powers is an essential
feature of constitutional government. An inherent feature of constitutional government is the
capacity to legislate and adjudicate. For a subnational unit to claim to represent the
sovereignty of its citizens—a claim separate from that of the national government—it must
have its own constitutional institutions: together with a subnational executive, there must be a
subnational legislature, which within the capacities granted in the national constitution makes
the laws that affect the subnational territory, and a judiciary that enforces the laws enacted by
the subnational legislature.
This article is divided into four parts. The first part examines the meaning of the
separation of powers. We then review definitions of federalism and find that most definitions
have focused on the vertical division of sovereignty between national and subnational levels
of government rather that the separation of powers in both. We examine subnational
governments in all existing federal systems, and find that the vast majority fit our definition.
The third section of the paper reviews empirical implications of our definition, applied to the
four cases of Latin American federations, which are often overlooked in most studies of
federalism. The final section concludes.
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Convention