29
Risk and autonomy (product multiplied)
MG
ES
SC
RS
PA
MT
MS
SE
AL
SP
AM SP
RN
PE
PB
BA
CE GO PB
MA
RJ
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Figure 2
Conclusions
This paper aimed at responding two main questions: first, why did the state
governments set up independent regulatory organizations; and second, what factors explain
their different degrees of autonomy. The new argument proposed by the paper was that
institutional choice is governed by electoral competition and political risk. We tested
whether institutional choice is a function of electoral vulnerability and risks. We predicted
that the more stable the electoral political game, and consequently, the smaller the electoral
risk for the elite group in power, the lesser the incentives Governors have to lock in
administrative arrangements his/her preferences since he/she would prefer to maintain
discretionary control. On the other hand, the greater the electoral competition among state
elites and, consequently, the more electoral vulnerable the elite group in power, the higher
the chances of the adoption of a more rigid and institutionalized institutional framework for
public policy. Therefore, we claimed that autonomy enjoyed by IRAs could be interpreted
as an intertemporal safeguard for the preferences of an enacting coalition.
It is worth to mention that hypothesizing institutional choice, as a function of
electoral vulnerability is a totally original theory without precedent in the pertinent
literature. We also explore the theory with reference to delegation in a context of a strong
executive – in contrast to current theories that focus on Congressual delegation. In order to
Convention