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Delegating powers at the state level: Explaining the institutional designs of independent regulatory agencies in Brazil
Unformatted Document Text:  32 Moe, Terry (1997) “The positive theory of public bureaucracy”, in Dennis C Mueller, Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Moe, Terry (1990) “The politics of structural choice: towards a theory of public bureaucracy”, in Oliver E Williamson ed. Organization theory from Chester Barnard to to the present and beyond, New York, Oxford University Press. Mueller, Bernardo and Pereira, Carlos (2002). “Credibility and the Design of Regulatory Agencies in Brazil.” Brazilian Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 22 (3): 65- 88. Santos, Fabiano (2001). O Poder Legislativo nos Estados: Diversidade e Coinvergência. Rio de Janeiro: FGV Press. Spiller, Pablo (1990). "Politicians, Interest Groups and Regulators: A Multiple Principals Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 33: 65-101. Tiller and Spiller, “The Choice of Administrative and Judicial Instruments: Strategy, Politics and Decision Costs,” 1996, mimeo. Weingast, B. R. and M. J. Moran (1983). “Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission.” Journal of Political Economy 91(5): 765-800 Weingast, B.R., 1984, "The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, 44: 147-191.

Authors: Pereira, Carlos. and Melo, Marcus.
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32
Moe, Terry (1997) “The positive theory of public bureaucracy”, in Dennis C
Mueller, Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Moe, Terry (1990) “The politics of structural choice: towards a theory of public
bureaucracy”, in Oliver E Williamson ed. Organization theory from Chester Barnard to to
the present and beyond, New York, Oxford University Press.
Mueller, Bernardo and Pereira, Carlos (2002). “Credibility and the Design of
Regulatory Agencies in Brazil.” Brazilian Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 22 (3): 65-
88.
Santos, Fabiano (2001). O Poder Legislativo nos Estados: Diversidade e
Coinvergência. Rio de Janeiro: FGV Press.
Spiller, Pablo (1990). "Politicians, Interest Groups and Regulators: A Multiple
Principals Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 33: 65-101.
Tiller and Spiller, “The Choice of Administrative and Judicial Instruments:
Strategy, Politics and Decision Costs,” 1996, mimeo.
Weingast, B. R. and M. J. Moran (1983). “Bureaucratic discretion or congressional
control? regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission.” Journal of Political
Economy 91(5): 765-800
Weingast, B.R., 1984, "The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent
Perspective (with Applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, 44: 147-191.


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