3
Representative democracy means government by selected individuals on behalf of
the people. One of the central themes in democratic theory as well as in empirical
political science is how and to what extent the rulers can be induced to act in the inter-
est of the ruled. Two different approaches to democratic government, the majoritarian
and proportional, can be identified. Traditionally, each is associated with one part of
the concept of “representative government:” The proportional approach emphasizes the
“representative” half, focusing on the ability of different groups to gain representation
according to their size, and bargaining among these in government. The majoritarian
vision emphasizes “government,” strong and decisive, by an executive agent controlled
by a plurality of citizens. This approach is less trusting of the benevolence of represen-
tatives, and emphasizes competition as a tool for accountability.
Samuel Beer formulates the trade-off between the virtues of the majoritarian and
proportional approaches thus: “Representative government must not only represent, it
must also govern”
1
This paper illustrates the representation-implementation dilemma
by demonstrating that one-party governments in German and Spanish regions govern
better and more effectively, according to their citizens, than do coalition governments
in the same regions. This supports the conjecture that coalition governments, despite
their purportedly better representative function, are less decisive in the act of governing.
Further, addressing the question of what mechanisms underlie this difference, a closer
look at German L¨ander reveals how disagreement within the executive branch affects
perceived government performance negatively.
1
Quoted in (Lijphart, 1999, 254).
Convention