Introduction
Since the fall of the USSR in 1991, the establishment of a stable, competitive
party system that effectively translates the preferences of the electorate in to policy has
been one of the least successful arenas of Russia’s transition (Mainwaring, 1999: 29). A
stable system of well-functioning political parties plays a critical role in democracy, both
by structuring competition for power, and thereby reducing electoral and policy
uncertainty (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003), and also by providing informational short-cuts
for voters who would otherwise lack the capacity to match up their policy preferences
with the proper candidates (Golosov, 2004: 1).
An important part of the reason for this is Russia’s super-presidential system,
which deprives the parliament of much of a role in policy-making, and thus rendering
parliamentary elections, which are more likely to be the domain of political parties, much
less important than presidential elections, which are dominated by the single figures of
the individual candidates. Tradition has had its role, as well, as both of the men who
have been successfully elected president of the Russian Federation declined to join or be
nominated by a political party. Nonetheless, there are also incentives for parties built into
the system, as well, most prominently the fact that half of the State Duma is elected by
closed-list proportional representation from a single national district, with a five percent
threshold.
Another important factor in the development of the Russian party system,
however, is the degree to which the political parties have penetrated Russia’s regions.
Russia is made up of 89 federal units (republics, oblasts, krais, and okrugs), and half of
the State Duma is elected from districts that are defined according to these federal units.
As in the United States’ Congress, every unit has at least one deputy, and none of the
Convention