Teitelbaum
Partners in Production or Crime?
5
of unions affect union protest behavior (Alvarez, Garrett and Lange 1991; Calmfors and Driffill
1988; Cameron 1984; Garrett and Way 2000; Golden 1993; Hibbs 1978; Iverson 1999; Korpi
and Shalev 1980; Lange and Garrett 1985; Olson 1982: 47-53).
2
These studies demonstrate that with increasing size and affiliation to powerful political
parties, unions begin to internalize the externalities of wage militancy. More specifically, as
unions become larger and affiliated to more powerful parties, they have a greater interest in
restraining militancy because higher inflation and unemployment associated with militancy
affects the broader union membership and the political fortunes of the party. On the other hand,
smaller more politically independent unions can “get away” with militancy because they have
less incentive to be concerned with the effects of their industrial disputes on broader economic
performance.
The South Asian industrial relations context is different from that of industrialized
nations because of the types of protest through which unions affect broader economic
performance. In South Asia, unions are more likely to disrupt economic performance by
engaging in violent protest than they are by engaging in routine protest.
However, the South Asian industrial relations context is similar to the industrialized
nations in terms of variations in union size and political affiliation. Just as variations in size and
party affiliations of unions explain varying levels of wage militancy in industrialized countries,
they can explain the varying propensity of unions to use violence in South Asia.
Since violent forms of protest are disruptive to economic development, it makes sense for
large unions and powerful political parties, which have an interest in economic growth, to
discourage violence among their members and encourage them to pursue their grievances
2
This literature also discusses the importance of variations in the centralization of the bargaining process. This
issue is not relevant for South Asia because virtually all wage agreements are negotiated at the firm level and not at
the industry or national level.
Convention