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Historical Legacies and Policy Choice: Labor and Public Sector Reform
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19
In the Czechoslovak case, the costs of insubordination to the Communist Party (KSC)
were even higher and entailed not just removal from the party but the loss of professional opportunities. It made little sense for those within the ruling elite in Czechoslovakia to look to social groups as means of building alliances for promoting their careers. If anything, such attempts would undermine their ability to move up in the power hierarchy. The pressure to conform to the party line was reinforced by targeting family members as punishment for insubordination.
61
In Poland and Egypt, on the other hand, such incentives remained underdeveloped and
were not applied with any consistency. The punishments for disloyalty were not only less onerous but applied sporadically and selectively. In both cases, there were good reasons for politically ambitious individuals to believe that the path for promotion could lead through a variety of channels. In both, building up one’s own power network and cultivating clients among various constituencies remained a viable path to political advancement. In Egypt, the very establishment of a political party proved problematic because of the deep distrust between various regime factions.
62
Here rather than serving as a means for bringing about elite cohesion,
the party and the state instead of working in tandem were frequently at loggerheads. Furthermore, unlike in the other three cases, the military was never fully subordinated to civilian control and became yet another player in the elite power struggles. In fact, by the 1980s in Egypt it seemed that one of the best strategies for moving ahead was to openly break with the ruling National Democratic Party since successful opposition candidates were regularly offered plum positions within the party and state administration as a way of enticing them back into the fold.
63
In Poland, the Communist Party (PZPR), despite its seeming omnipresence, was often
immobilized by conflicts between its various factions and at the same time was unable to establish control over regional party bosses. While the party was almost continuously torn by factionalism, the lines of cleavage shifted over time. During the 1950s the deepest divisions existed between factions that were more Moscow-oriented and those that urged a more indigenous road to socialism. In late 1960s another faction advocating economic modernization and reforms emerged. The emergence of Solidarity movement in 1980 further fractured the party. The PZPR recognized that these internal party struggles undermined their ability to govern effectively. Yet, although many internal reforms took place, unlike in Czechoslovakia mechanisms for punishing disloyalty were never put in place. Although party dissenters would sometimes be removed from office, more often than not they were simply reassigned to another post rather than facing expulsion from party ranks.
64
The persistence of elite factionalism had similar outcomes in both cases. Over time, the
worsening economic conditions in turn would trigger labor mobilization. Once labor was mobilized, it was able to successfully extract concessions because of the favorable opportunity structure that party elite factionalism provided. Unlike in Mexico and Czechoslovakia, where labor organizations became over time increasingly dependent on and subordinate to the state, in Poland and Egypt, labor gradually extracted substantial concessions. Furthermore, over time as the economic conditions in Poland and Egypt worsened, both regimes with fewer material resources at their disposal were less able to offer just substantive concessions in the form of
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| | Authors: Paczynska, Agnieszka. |
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19
In the Czechoslovak case, the costs of insubordination to the Communist Party (KSC)
were even higher and entailed not just removal from the party but the loss of professional
opportunities. It made little sense for those within the ruling elite in Czechoslovakia to look to
social groups as means of building alliances for promoting their careers. If anything, such
attempts would undermine their ability to move up in the power hierarchy. The pressure to
conform to the party line was reinforced by targeting family members as punishment for
insubordination.
61
In Poland and Egypt, on the other hand, such incentives remained underdeveloped and
were not applied with any consistency. The punishments for disloyalty were not only less
onerous but applied sporadically and selectively. In both cases, there were good reasons for
politically ambitious individuals to believe that the path for promotion could lead through a
variety of channels. In both, building up one’s own power network and cultivating clients among
various constituencies remained a viable path to political advancement. In Egypt, the very
establishment of a political party proved problematic because of the deep distrust between
various regime factions.
62
Here rather than serving as a means for bringing about elite cohesion,
the party and the state instead of working in tandem were frequently at loggerheads.
Furthermore, unlike in the other three cases, the military was never fully subordinated to civilian
control and became yet another player in the elite power struggles. In fact, by the 1980s in Egypt
it seemed that one of the best strategies for moving ahead was to openly break with the ruling
National Democratic Party since successful opposition candidates were regularly offered plum
positions within the party and state administration as a way of enticing them back into the fold.
63
In Poland, the Communist Party (PZPR), despite its seeming omnipresence, was often
immobilized by conflicts between its various factions and at the same time was unable to
establish control over regional party bosses. While the party was almost continuously torn by
factionalism, the lines of cleavage shifted over time. During the 1950s the deepest divisions
existed between factions that were more Moscow-oriented and those that urged a more
indigenous road to socialism. In late 1960s another faction advocating economic modernization
and reforms emerged. The emergence of Solidarity movement in 1980 further fractured the
party. The PZPR recognized that these internal party struggles undermined their ability to govern
effectively. Yet, although many internal reforms took place, unlike in Czechoslovakia
mechanisms for punishing disloyalty were never put in place. Although party dissenters would
sometimes be removed from office, more often than not they were simply reassigned to another
post rather than facing expulsion from party ranks.
64
The persistence of elite factionalism had similar outcomes in both cases. Over time, the
worsening economic conditions in turn would trigger labor mobilization. Once labor was
mobilized, it was able to successfully extract concessions because of the favorable opportunity
structure that party elite factionalism provided. Unlike in Mexico and Czechoslovakia, where
labor organizations became over time increasingly dependent on and subordinate to the state, in
Poland and Egypt, labor gradually extracted substantial concessions. Furthermore, over time as
the economic conditions in Poland and Egypt worsened, both regimes with fewer material
resources at their disposal were less able to offer just substantive concessions in the form of
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