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Parties or Nations? Political Cleavages over EU Efforts to Create a Single European Market for Corporate Control

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Abstract:

Attempts to create a single European market for corporate control stretch back more than thirty years. The EU takeover directive which passed in December 2003 is a far cry from this ambition. After decades of negotiation, member states agreed to disagree on the legality of anti-takeover defenses. Analysis of the political issues at stake indicates two distinct lines of conflict. First, active markets for corporate control have distributional implications inside firms by securing benefits for shareholders at the expense of employees. Second, due to different national starting points, the benefits and costs of a unified European takeover regime are distributed unevenly across EU member states. How did political struggles over these issues play out in the European Parliament, where delegates from all EU member states join European party groups according to their ideological inclinations?
Analyzing the roll call vote on the takeover directive of July 4, 2001, we find systematic differences in the relative importance of national and party group affiliation depending on the party group in question. Intra-group cohesion was strong among the left-wing, green, liberal and right-wing party groups. By contrast, the center-right and center-left party groups were both internally divided, with nationality serving as a strong predictor of voting behaviour. Our findings are relevant to debates about the political underpinnings of Varieties of Capitalism, research on cleavages structures in the European Parliament and anyone interested in the prospects for legislative convergence of European takeover regimes.

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parti (136), takeov (108), vote (87), 0 (87), direct (85), h (77), nation (76), market (75), group (75), countri (74), corpor (72), european (69), deleg (65), sharehold (65), 1 (55), govern (50), 2003 (48), compani (47), member (46), m (45), 3 (43),
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Name: American Political Science Association
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MLA Citation:

Callaghan, Helen. and Höpner, Martin. "Parties or Nations? Political Cleavages over EU Efforts to Create a Single European Market for Corporate Control" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59753_index.html>

APA Citation:

Callaghan, H. and Höpner, M. , 2004-09-02 "Parties or Nations? Political Cleavages over EU Efforts to Create a Single European Market for Corporate Control" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59753_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Attempts to create a single European market for corporate control stretch back more than thirty years. The EU takeover directive which passed in December 2003 is a far cry from this ambition. After decades of negotiation, member states agreed to disagree on the legality of anti-takeover defenses. Analysis of the political issues at stake indicates two distinct lines of conflict. First, active markets for corporate control have distributional implications inside firms by securing benefits for shareholders at the expense of employees. Second, due to different national starting points, the benefits and costs of a unified European takeover regime are distributed unevenly across EU member states. How did political struggles over these issues play out in the European Parliament, where delegates from all EU member states join European party groups according to their ideological inclinations?
Analyzing the roll call vote on the takeover directive of July 4, 2001, we find systematic differences in the relative importance of national and party group affiliation depending on the party group in question. Intra-group cohesion was strong among the left-wing, green, liberal and right-wing party groups. By contrast, the center-right and center-left party groups were both internally divided, with nationality serving as a strong predictor of voting behaviour. Our findings are relevant to debates about the political underpinnings of Varieties of Capitalism, research on cleavages structures in the European Parliament and anyone interested in the prospects for legislative convergence of European takeover regimes.

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Associated Document Available American Political Science Association
Associated Document Available Political Research Online

Document Type: .pdf
Page count: 31
Word count: 11376
Text sample:
Parties or Nations? Political Cleavages over EU Efforts to Create a Single European Market for Corporate Control Helen Callaghan* and Martin Höpner** *Ph.D. candidate in Political Science Northwestern University Evanston IL USA h-callaghan@northwestern.edu **Research Fellow Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Paulstr. 3 50676 Cologne Germany mh@mpifg.de Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association September 2 - September 5 2004. Copyright by the American Political Science Association. Abstract Attempts to create
Netherlands 20% Austria Greece 10% Germany 0% 0 1 2 3 4 5 Country's score on the La Porta et al. index of shareholder protection 30


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