Parties or Nations?
Callaghan, H. and M. Höpner, APSA 2004
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group members voting yes, but is important to note that there is no discernable difference
in the voting behavior of delegates affiliated with center-left (PSE) and center-right (PPE-
DE) party groups (see figure 1). Figure 2 shows that in all countries except Spain, Italy
and France, more than 80 percent of delegates from center-right and center- left parties
voted together across party lines.
[Figures 1 and 2 here]
Given that 65 percent of all delegates belong to either the PSE or the PPE-DE
groups, this means that for most delegates, considerations related to their party group
affiliation were not the dominant influence on voting behavior. As can be seen from
figure 3, the overall percentage of delegates supporting the directive varies dramatically
across countries, ranging from one percent in Germany to more than ninety percent in
Denmark and the UK.
[Figure 3 here]
In sum, whether nationality or party group affiliation was the stronger
determinant of voting behaviour depends on the party group in question. Intra-group
cohesion was strong among the left-wing, green, liberal and right-wing party blocks. By
contrast, the larger center-right (PPE-DE) and center- left party blocks (PSE) were both
internally divided, with nationality serving as a strong predictor of voting behavior.
5. What explains the observed pattern?
Why did overall support for the directive vary so dramatically across countries?
As discussed in section 3.2 above, one possible explanation could be the asymmetric
economic impact of the directive on different member states, depending on the degree of
capital market orientation prior to passage of the directive. The data displayed in figure 4
is broadly compatible with this hypothesis. In Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, the
Netherlands and Austria, where shareholder protection is below average, less than 30
percent of all delegates supported the d irective. In Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland and
Convention